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Global engagement of firms can take a variety of forms. We argue that there are considerable advantages 
of developing models that allow for a wide set of alternatives of organizational form. We illustrate this 
firstly using plant level data which allows us to distinguish firms that serve only the domestic market, 
firms that export final goods abroad, firms that outsource abroad the production of some of the 
intermediate inputs abroad, firms that own foreign plants abroad, and firms that do more than one of 
those activities. In our estimation we consider the relationship between productivity all the choice of 
organizational form.  We then present a simple model of the firm that is flexible enough to capture the 
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The organization of international firms can be very complex. The liberalization of final goods, intermediate 
goods and capital markets is offering new opportunities for reshuffling cross-national border production 
patterns. Firms sell their products in foreign markets, locate production plants abroad, outsource the 
production of intermediate inputs to foreign firms or import intermediate goods from their own affiliates 
located abroad. Numerous studies document the recent explosion of interest in these activities. It is also 
clear from the same evidence that all firms do not face the same opportunities. For example, we know 
that, on average, more productive firms export more, invest abroad more and outsource more. 
These studies make clear how rich the organizational form menu is. However, it is also clear that each of 
these studies focuses on a limited subset of the options available. From a theoretical standpoint the 
advantage of a narrow focus is tractability. But there are also disadvantages of ignoring some of the 
alternatives. Consider the following example. Suppose that we want to consider the relationship between 
FDI and exports ignoring the possibility that a firm might opt to produce final output in one place and 
intermediate inputs in another place (i.e. we restrict our attention to the integration case). In that case, we 
will compare the total costs of production in the two locations with transport costs. If we find that the 
difference in the costs of producing abroad (that include any additional fixed costs related to the 
establishment of new plants) and the corresponding home costs is relatively high compared to transport 
costs, we will conclude that the export strategy is the right choice. But suppose that what drives up the 
costs of foreign production is the cost of intermediates. In that case, the firm can choose the non-
integration option whereby it produces all inputs at home and uses FDI for the assembly of the final goods 
consumed abroad. 
In this paper, we argue that there are considerable advantages of developing models that allow for a 
wider set of alternatives of organizational form. We demonstrate empirically potential gains from following 
a more general approach using a plant level database from the Republic of Ireland we examine the 
relationship between productivity and the likelihood of adapting a given organizational form. We find that 
the predictions are sensitive to the choice of menu of forms included in the estimation.  
Then, we present a simple model of the firm that is flexible enough to capture the trade-offs between a 
great variety of organizational forms. Our work is mainly methodological, aiming to distinguish within a 
unique framework the plethora of alternatives available to international firms, and thus we follow a partial 
equilibrium approach. More specifically, our firm has the following options: it can produce final output 
either/both home or/and abroad; it can produce intermediate goods either/both home or/and abroad; it can 
outsource intermediate inputs either home or abroad. When the firm produces final output both home and 
abroad we say that it follows a `horizontal FDI' strategy while when it produces final output only abroad we 
say that it follows a `vertical FDI' strategy. Furthermore, when the firm produces both final output and 
intermediate inputs in the same location we say that the firm is `integrated'. 
We demonstrate how the choice among the alternatives depends on (a) the relative strengths of the 
domestic and the foreign demand for the firm's final output, (b) its available technology for producing final 
and intermediate goods, and (c) costs that include productions expenditures (both fixed and variable) and 
transport costs. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The organization of international ﬁrms can be very complex. The liberal-
ization of ﬁnal goods, intermediate goods and capital markets is oﬀering
new opportunities for reshuﬄing cross-national border production pat-
terns. Firms sell their products in foreign markets, locate production
plants abroad, outsource the production of intermediate inputs to for-
eign ﬁr m so ri m p o r ti n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sf r o mt h e i ro w na ﬃliates located
abroad. Numerous studies, reviewed in Helpman (2006), document the
recent explosion of interest in these activities. It is also clear from the
same evidence that all ﬁrms do not face the same opportunities. For
example, we know that, on average, more productive ﬁrms export more,
invest abroad more and outsource more.
The observation that exporters are larger and more productive has
motivated a new strand of theoretical research in international trade that
introduces ﬁrm heterogeneity in traditional trade models.1 The model by
Melitz (2003) has proved to be very useful for analyzing a host of issues
related to the organization of international production. For example,
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) demonstrate that the more produc-
tive ﬁrms will serve foreign markets using FDI, medium productivity
ﬁrms will use exports to serve the foreign market while low productiv-
ity ﬁrms will only serve the domestic market. Grossman, Helpman and
Szeidl (2006) allow for more complex strategies whereby ﬁrms can use
FDI for both/either intermediate and/or ﬁnal goods production. They
show that the high productivity ﬁrms will produce both types of goods
abroad, medium productivity ﬁrms will use FDI for the production of
intermediate goods while they will assemble ﬁn a lg o o d sa th o m ea n d
low productivity ﬁrms will produce both types at home and export ﬁnal
goods. By contrast, Antras and Helpman (2004) focus on the trade-
oﬀ between outsourcing and FDI. They ﬁnd that the high productivity
ﬁrms insource abroad (FDI) and the low productivity ﬁrms will exit the
market. Among the ﬁrms with medium productivity levels, the more
productive ﬁrms will outsource abroad, the less productive ﬁrms will
outsource at home while those in between will integrate.
The above studies make clear how rich the organizational form menu
is. However, it is also clear that each of these studies focuses on a lim-
ited subset of the options available.2 From a theoretical standpoint the
1See, for example, Montagna (2001), Jean (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003).
2We have only referred to those studies that rank ﬁrms according to productivity
because they are closely related to our empirical work that we use to oﬀer further
motivation for our theoretical approach. However, other studies on the choice of
organizational form also have restricted their attention to a small number of alter-
2advantage of a narrow focus is tractability. But there are also disad-
vantages of ignoring some of the alternatives. Consider the following
example. Suppose that we want to consider the relationship between
FDI and exports ignoring the possibility that a ﬁrm might opt to pro-
duce ﬁnal output in one place and intermediate inputs in another place
(i.e. we restrict our attention to the integration case). In that case,
we will compare the total costs of production in the two locations with
transport costs. If we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in the costs of producing
abroad (that include any additional ﬁxed costs related to the establish-
ment of new plants) and the corresponding home costs is relatively high
compared to transport costs, we will conclude that the export strategy
is the right choice. But suppose that what drives up the costs of foreign
production is the cost of intermediates. In that case, the ﬁrm can choose
the non-integration option whereby it produces all inputs at home and
uses FDI for the assembly of the ﬁnal goods consumed abroad.3
In this paper, we argue that there are considerable advantages of
developing models that allow for a wider set of alternatives of organiza-
tional form. In the following section, we demonstrate empirically poten-
tial gains from following a more general approach. Using a plant level
database from the Republic of Ireland we examine the relationship be-
tween productivity and the likelihood of adapting a given organizational
form. Our sample consists of ﬁr m st h a ts e r v eo n l yt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e t ,
ﬁrms that export ﬁnal goods abroad, ﬁrms that outsource abroad the
production of some of the intermediate inputs abroad, ﬁrms that own
foreign plants abroad, and ﬁr m st h a td om o r et h a no n eo ft h o s ea c t i v -
ities. In our ﬁrst estimation we consider the impact of productivity on
the trade-oﬀ between exports and outsourcing, ignoring completely FDI,
and we ﬁnd (a) that exporters are more productive than non-exporters,
and (b) exporting ﬁrms that also outsource some of the intermediate
inputs abroad are more productive than ﬁrms that only export. In our
second estimation we examine the relationship between productivity and
the trade-oﬀ between exports and FDI, this time ignoring outsourcing,
and we ﬁnd similar results. Namely, (a) that exporters are more produc-
tive than non-exporters, and (b) exporting ﬁrms that also invest abroad
natives; see, for example, Yeaple (2003) on the choice between the two types of FDI,
McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) on the trade-oﬀ between out-
sourcing and integration, Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005), Grossman, Helman
and Seizdl (2005) on the trade-oﬀ between outsourcing and FDI in intermediate in-
puts (oﬀshoring), and Ottaviano and Turini (2007) on the choice beteen exports, FDI
and outsourcing.
3Helpman (2006) refers to a number of studies that demonstrate the tendency
towards further fragmentation of production as is evident by the tremendous growth
of trade in inputs across national borders.
3are more productive than ﬁrms that only export. Lastly, in our third
estimation we consider all three activities, i.e. exports, outsourcing and
FDI. Once more, we ﬁnd that exporters are more productive than non-
exporters and that ﬁrms that own plants abroad are even more produc-
tive but we also ﬁnd that ﬁrms that outsource are not more productive
unless they also invest abroad. The results of the third estimation in-
dicate that the relationship between productivity and outsourcing that
w eh a v ef o u n di no u rﬁrst estimation is driven by those ﬁrms that invest
abroad.
In a recent study, Tomiura (2007) using Japanese data, has found
that ﬁrms that outsource are more productive than ﬁrms that only ex-
port although less productive than ﬁrms that invest abroad, and these
ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Antras and
Helpman (2004). In our sample, ﬁrms that only outsource are not more
productive than domestic ﬁrms. The diﬀerence in these estimations
might be due to diﬀerences between Irish and Japanese ﬁrms, which
is reﬂected in the composition of the two samples: over 90 percent of
Japanese ﬁrms are purely domestic, while only a quarter of Irish ﬁrms
do not engage in any type of internationalization activity. Hence, it is
not clear that results for Japan should be expected to also apply to a
small and highly open economy. Overall, our study makes clear some
of the advantages of using models that allow for a richer structure of
organization form.4
In section 3, we present a simple model of the ﬁrm that is ﬂexible
enough to capture the trade-oﬀs between a great variety of organiza-
tional forms. Our work is mainly methodological, aiming to distinguish
within a unique framework the plethora of alternatives available to in-
ternational ﬁrms, and thus we follow a partial equilibrium approach.
More speciﬁcally, our ﬁrm has the following options: it can produce ﬁ-
nal output either/both home or/and abroad; it can produce intermediate
goods either/both home or/and abroad; it can outsource intermediate
inputs either home or abroad. When the ﬁrm produces ﬁnal output
both home and abroad we say that it follows a ‘horizontal FDI’ strategy
while when it produces ﬁnal output only abroad we say that it follows
a ‘vertical FDI’ strategy. Furthermore, when the ﬁrm produces both
ﬁnal output and intermediate inputs in the same location we say that
4Earlier empirical studies have followed a more restricted approach. For example,
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005), Girma, Görg and Strobl (2004), Head and Ries
(2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) focus on the impact of productivity
on the trade-oﬀ between FDI and exports while Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2008) and
Hijzen, Inui and Todo (forthcoming) examine the relationship between productivity
and outsourcing.
4the ﬁrm is ‘integrated’.5 W ed e m o n s t r a t eh o wt h ec h o i c ea m o n gt h ea l -
ternatives depends on (a) the relative strengths of the domestic and the
f o r e i g nd e m a n df o rt h eﬁrm’s ﬁnal output, (b) its available technology
for producing ﬁnal and intermediate goods, and (c) costs that include
productions expenditures (both ﬁxed and variable) and transport costs.
2 Organizational Form and Productivity
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence that demonstrates
the potential advantages of using models that allow for a rich menu of
organizational forms. Our data come from the Annual Business Survey
of Economic Impact (ABSEI), an annual survey of a large sample of
manufacturing and services plants in the Republic of Ireland. Plants
are included in this survey if they have at least 10 employees, but are
not necessarily dropped if they fall below this threshold. The coverage
is about 60 to 80 percent of the targeted population. Data from the
ABSEI are available to us for the years 1999 and 2000.
The data set provides plant level information on standard variables
such as employment and output, but also on nationality of ownership, ex-
penditure on R&D and training activities at the plant level. In terms of
international activities of ﬁrms, the data provide information on exports
and, quite uniquely, outward investment and international outsourciEx-
porting and outsourcingng. For these two categories we exploit dummy
variables which are equal to one if a ﬁr mh a s" a n yo v e r s e a so ﬃces or dis-
tribution facilities" and if the plant has "out-sourced production to other
countries". Taking all this information together we can deduct whether
ad o m e s t i cﬁrm is an exporter, a multinational or outsources production
abroad, and whether a ﬁrm combines diﬀerent modes of foreign activity.
This provides us with a rich description of internationalization activities
of ﬁrms, similar to Tomiura (2007).
Our sample consists of 1,305 domestic plants. Table 1 shows the
breakdown of ﬁrms into diﬀerent categories of internationalization. Note,
ﬁrstly, that 26 percent of observations relate to ﬁrms that are purely do-
mestic, i.e., do not export, not invest abroad, nor outsource. At the
other end of the spectrum, 5 percent of ﬁrms engage in all three ac-
tivities simultaneously. By far the most important category of ﬁrms
is only export, which applies to 45 percent of observations, while 15
5Notice that in the literature the terms vertical and horizontal have been used to
distinguish either diﬀerent types of FDI or diﬀerent relations between the production
of inputs and output. This has not been a cause of confusion as these organization
forms till now have been considered separately. Here we choose these terms to capture
the two diﬀerent types of FDI. In the verical FDI case we can think of the ﬁrm as
having its headquarters at home and its production plant abroad.
5percent of ﬁrms invest abroad and export (but do not outsource produc-
tion) simultaneously.6 This distribution of ﬁrms is in stark contrast to
Tomiura’s (2007) work on Japanese data. He ﬁnds that 90 percent of
ﬁrms are purely domestic, i.e., do not engage in any internationalization
activity. Roughly 4 percent of ﬁrms are exporters only, with the remain-
der of ﬁrms being fairly evenly distributed across the other categories.
This undoubtedly reﬂects the very open nature of the Irish economy and
also casts doubt on the applicability of Tomiura’s ﬁndings to very open
economies.
Table 1: Distribution of ﬁrms across internationalisation
categories
Internationalisation mode Percent of observations
FDI, exporting and outsourcing 5.5
FDI and exporting 15.3
Exporting and outsourcing 7.9
Exporting only 45.1
Purely domestic 26.3
Note: categories are mutually exclusive.
In order to show the advantages of using a general approach when
classifying ﬁrms according to their internationalization activities, as mo-
tivated by the theoretic model, we relate plant level characteristics to the
choice of mode. To do so we estimate the probability that a ﬁrm chooses
one of the modes of internationalization, conditional on a number of
plant characteristics. This is done using a multinominal logit approach.
The plant level characteristics considered are labour productivity (sales
per employee, similar to Tomiura, 2007), plant size (measured as em-
ployment size) and dummy variables for whether or not a plant is R&D
active and provides formal training. The choice of variables is broadly
motivated by recent theoretical models, as well as by the related em-
pirical literature which show that productivity, size, and measures of
technology and skills are important determinants of the choice to be-
come an exporter or invest abroad. However, it should also be noted
that the main point of this exercise is not only to show that these vari-
ables matter, but more importantly that the eﬀect of variables, and here
in particular productivity, depends on how exactly we deﬁne the mode
of internationalization.
6The number of ﬁrms that only outsource, only invest abroad, or invest abroad
and outsource (but not export) are negligible. We therefore drop those ﬁrms from
the analysis, as they appear to be outliers.
6In our ﬁrst empirical analysis, we allow for only three types of interna-
tionalization: exporting and FDI, only exporting, and purely domestic.
Hence, we ignore the possibility of outsourcing. The results are reported
in Table 2. They show, ﬁrstly, the choice to do both exporting and FDI
compared to remaining purely domestic is positively related to all plant
characteristics: productivity, size, R&D and training. We also ﬁnd that
the choice only to export compared with being purely domestic is posi-
tively related to size, R&D and training, but not labour productivity.7
Table 2: Multinomial logit:
Exporting (X) and FDI
XX , F D I
Productivity -0.001 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001)***
R&D dummy 0.892 (0.103)*** 1.687 (0.137)***
Training dummy 0.239 (0.103)** 0.628 (0.149)***
Employment 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.009 (0.002)***
Constant -0.082 (0.095) -2.301 (0.154)***
#o fo b s . 2 5 9 6 2 5 9 6
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08
Wald 296.71*** 296.71***
Baseline category is: purely domestic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
In the second analysis in Table 3 we only consider exporting and out-
sourcing and ignore the possibility that plants may also invest abroad.
The results show that the choice to do both exporting and outsourcing
relative to remaining purely domestic is positively related to all plant
level variables, while the choice only to export is not related to produc-
tivity.
Table 3: Multinomial logit:
Exporting (X) and outsourcing (Z)
7The result that choosing to export compared to remaining domestic is not related
to productivity is in line with Girma et al. (2004).
7XX , Z
Productivity 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)**
R&D dummy 1.007 (0.102)*** 1.405 (0.152)***
Training dummy 0.298 (0.103)*** 0.382 (0.159)**
Employment 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.008 (0.002)***
Constant -0.141 (0.104) -2.063 (0.151)***
#o fo b s . 2 5 9 6 2 5 9 6
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06
Wald 214.57*** 214.57***
Baseline category is: purely domestic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
In Table 4 we then allow for all possible choices and combinations
of FDI, exporting and outsourcing. In line with the earlier results we
still ﬁnd that the choice only to export relative to a purely domestic
plant is not related to productivity, but otherwise is positively related
to size, R&D and training. We also ﬁnd that the choice to engage in
all three activities simultaneously is positively related to all plant level
characteristics, as is the choice to engage in exporting and FDI, but
not outsourcing. However, we now ﬁnd that the choice to do exporting
and outsourcing, but not FDI, relative to remaining purely domestic
is not related to plant level productivity or training activity. Hence,
the previously found result that ﬁrms with higher productivity levels
are more likely to choose exporting and outsourcing (Table 3) is only
true for ﬁrms that also do FDI - but not for ﬁrms you do not invest
abroad. This, hence, shows that it is important to take into account
all possibilities when considering ﬁrms’ internationalization modes and
the relationship of those with plant level characteristics, in particular
productivity.8
Table 4: Multinomial logit:
Exporting (X), FDI and outsourcing (Z)
8We have also performed a robustness check which deﬁnes the R&D and training
variables as intensities (i.e., expenditure on the activity relative to sales) instead of
zero/one type dummies. However, the results on the relationship between produc-
tivity and the choices remains robust to this alteration.
8E X ,F D I ,Z X ,F D I X ,Z X
Productivity 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
R&D 1.800 *** 1.651 *** 1.203 *** 0.840 ***
(0.238) (0.148) (0.175) (0.106)
Training 0.615 ** 0.633 *** 0.273 0.234 **
(0.253) (0.164) (0.185) (0.106)
Employment 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -3.717 *** -2.588 *** -2.278 *** -0.203 **
(0.247) (0.172) (0.184) (0.097)
# of obs 2596 2596 2596 2596
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Wald 315.92*** 315.92*** 315.92*** 315.92***
Baseline category is: purely domestic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
3 The Choice of Organizational Form
This section sketches a theoretical model that allows consideration of
many possible organisational forms. A ﬁrm uses an Ethier (2005) type
technology for combining a variety of inputs to produce ﬁnal output, Y :
Y =( aI + bZ)
γ (min{cS,dU})
1−γ (1)
The technology brings together under constant returns to scale an inter-
mediate material input with labor. The intermediate input can either
be produced at home, I, in which case we say that the ﬁrm is integrated
or can be outsourced, Z.T h e ﬁrm also uses both skilled, S, and un-
skilled, U,l a b o ri nﬁxed proportions. We are going to begin with the
case where the ﬁrm supplies only the home market, produces only at
home and gets its inputs only from home. Let wI, wZ, wS,a n dwU
denote the corresponding input prices at home.9









b . In the former case, the ﬁrm incurs two
types of ﬁxed costs; namely ﬁxed costs related to the production of ﬁnal
output, FY,a n dﬁxed costs related to the production of the input, FI.
9For labor these prices are wages. In the case of the intermediate input these
prices reﬂect any variable costs associated either with their production (in the case
of integration) or with their purchase from other ﬁrms (in the case of outsourcing).
In the latter case, these can be both explicit and implicit, the latter reﬂecting trade-
oﬀs arising because of contractual incompleteness. Helpman (2006) provides a very
interesting overview of this literature in the context of international ﬁrms.
9In contrast, when the ﬁrm outsources the input it incurs only those ﬁxed
costs related to the production of ﬁnal output.
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1−γ = ¯ Y (2)
where ¯ Y denotes the exogenous output target. The f.o.c. are:







= λc(1 − γ)(aI)
γ (cS)
−γ
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier: After some algebraic manipulation

















where the superscript I indicates that this is the solution for the inte-






wI .P r o ﬁts for the vertical integration
case, ΠI,a r eg i v e nb y :
Π






























10where the superscript Z indicates that this is the solution for the out-






wZ .P r o ﬁts for the outsourcing case,
ΠZ,a r eg i v e nb y :
Π








Comparison of (6) and (10) determines the ﬁrm’s optimal choice.
3.1 International Transactions
Now, suppose that only a fraction h of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal output is consumed
at home while the remaining is consumed abroad. Once more, we assume
that the output targets are ﬁxed which implies that without any further
loss of generality we can ignore relative prices. We further assume that





denote the the input prices abroad and F∗
Y and F∗
I the corresponding
ﬁxed costs. In addition, we allow for imperfect technology transfer across
borders and thus a ∗ on the technology parameters, a, b, c, d,a n dγ
captures diﬀerences in the technologies used home and abroad.
3.1.1 Exports
In this case all production takes place at home, i.e. there is integration,
and the ﬁrm exports a fraction 1−h of its output. We assume that there
is an ‘iceberg’ transport cost τ per unit of exports. Then proﬁts ΠE are
given by:
Π









We are going to distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI. We
have vertical FDI when all ﬁnal output production takes place abroad
and thus the output consumed at home is imported. Under horizontal
FDI the ﬁrm produces at home the fraction of out put consumed at
home and produces abroad the remaining. In this section, we consider
t h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrm is integrated.
Vertical Now the ﬁrm incurs transport costs when it imports part of
the its output produced abroad. Proﬁts ΠVFD Iare:
Π








































Horizontal In this case the ﬁrm avoids transport costs but incurs all
types of ﬁxed costs. The CRS technology implies that proﬁts ΠHFDI
are:
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When the ﬁrm outsources the production of intermediate inputs incurs
an additional transport cost related to their transfer. We assume that
this additional cost is reﬂected in their price. Proﬁts ΠZ∗ (where the ∗
indicates that the ﬁrm outsources abroad) are:
Π






























Up to this point we have derived the costs of individual foreign activities.
However, many globally engaged ﬁrms have multiple activities and the
above taxonomy is inadequate for classiﬁcation purposes. For example
some ﬁr m sh a v ef o r e i g na ﬃliates (FDI) and at the same time outsource
the production of inputs. Others produce inputs in one country while
they produce ﬁnal output in another. In this section, we add to the
above taxonomy a few commonly encountered types of multinationals.
Vertical FDI and Outsourcing This type of ﬁrm produces all ﬁnal
output abroad and also outsources the intermediate input. The ﬁrm can
outsource either home or abroad and below we consider the latter case.
The price of outsourcing in this case, w∗∗
z , must be lower than the price
w∗
Z the ﬁrm would have to pay had be producing at home as it avoids











































Vertical FDI without Integration The ﬁrm produces ﬁnal output
abroad and the intermediate input at home. The new price of the input
w∗∗
I reﬂect the transport costs associated with its transfer abroad. Proﬁts
ΠVFD I
W (where the subscript W denotes without integration) are:
Π
VFD I
W =( 1− hτ) ¯ Y − F
∗



































I . Notice that the productivity of the input a is
not starred because it is produced at home.
Horizontal FDI and Outsourcing We consider the case when both








































13Horizontal FDI without Integration We consider the case when
the intermediate input is produced by the domestic aﬃliate and then a
fraction is exported to the foreign aﬃliate. The ﬁrm avoids the ﬁxed
costs associated with the production of the intermediate input abroad,
however, the cost of the input for the foreign aﬃliate w∗∗
I includes the






































The above analysis of the model has identiﬁed three types of variables
that can aﬀect the optimal choice of transactions; namely, variables
related to costs, variables related to technology and variables related to
the demand for ﬁnal output at home and abroad.
3.2.1 Costs
The model includes three types of costs: ﬁxed, variable and transport.
Fixed costs are incurred when the ﬁrm establishes a plant for the produc-
tion of either ﬁnal output or intermediate input. Variable costs include
outlays on the intermediate input (that depend on whether the input is
produced by the ﬁrm or is outsourced) and labor payments (both skilled
and unskilled). Finally, transport costs are incurred when goods and
inputs are transferred across borders. A ﬁrm that does not opt for hor-
izontal FDI will incur costs related to the transfer of ﬁnal output while
a ﬁrm that is neither integrated nor outsourcing locally will incur costs
related to the transfer of the intermediate input.
3.2.2 Technology
There are good reasons to believe that technology transfer across bor-
ders cannot always be perfect. For example, technological diﬀerences
in the production of the input (whether produced by the same ﬁrm
or outsourced) will shown up in diﬀerences between a (in the case of
in-ﬁrm production) or b (outsourcing) and their corresponding starred
values. Similarly, worker productivity diﬀerences are captured by diﬀer-
ences between c (for skilled) and d (unskilled) and their corresponding
values abroad. In addition, diﬀerences in costs related to the assembly
of ﬁnal output are depicted by the parameters γ and γ∗.
143.2.3 Demand
The choice of international transactions will aﬀect the cost of production
w h i c hi nt u r nw i l la ﬀect the demand for ﬁnal output at home and abroad.
To keep things simple, we have taken demand as exogenously given.
Nevertheless, for a given total demand ¯ Y the optimal choice of ﬁnancial
transactions will depend on diﬀerences between domestic and foreign
demand captured by the parameter h.
T a b l e5l i s t sa l lt y p e so fﬁrms analyzed above together with the
variables that aﬀect their total costs. Since what matters for the choice
of all inputs is their relative costs adjusted for diﬀerences in technological
parameters we report the relevant ratios.10
Table 5: Cost Comparisons




































































































In order to demonstrate some of the advantages of our general ap-
proach consider once more the example that we mentioned in the Intro-
duction. Suppose that we focus on the choice between horizontal FDI
and exports ignoring for the moment that ﬁrms can also follow the ‘non-
integration’ strategy. Horizontal FDI requires that the ﬁrm incurs ﬁxed
costs for the production of both ﬁnal output and intermediate inputs
where the former can be related to the establishment of an assembly
plant and the latter with the establishment of a production plant. Sup-
pose that F∗
I is prohibitively high. in that case we might conclude that
10By no means the above table provides a complete classiﬁcation of all possible
organizational forms. However, the model is suﬃciently ﬂexible to account for trans-
actions that we have so far ignored. For example, ﬁrms have the option to outsource
either in the home market or abroad but above we have only focused on the latter
case. Also, when we considered the non-integration vertical FDI case (fragmenta-
tion of production) we have assumed that the ﬁrm produces ﬁnal output abroad and
intermediate inputs at home but the reverse is also possible.
15the ﬁr mm i g h to p tt op r o d u c eo n l ya th o m ea n du s ee x p o r t st os a t i s f y
the foreign demand for its ﬁnal output. However, if transport costs, τ,
are also relatively high then the ﬁr mm i g h tc h o o s et op r o d u c ea l li n p u t s
at home and establish a single plant abroad for assembling ﬁnal output
sold there and thus avoid both the high ﬁxed costs associated with es-
tablishing a production plant abroad and high transport cost associated
with exports.
4C o n c l u s i o n
There are many strategies available to ﬁrms that attempt to compete
in international commodity markets. These strategies are the subject of
study of the fast growing literature on the organization of ﬁrms. The
majority of studies have focused on only a couple of the many alterna-
tive strategies available. We have argued that potentially this narrow
focus might lead to wrong predictions concerning the behavior of multi-
national ﬁrms and have provided some empirical evidence from plant
level data for the Republic of Ireland that support our argument. We
have also proposed a simple partial equilibrium model that is suﬃciently
ﬂexible to allow for a much more general analysis of the choices available
to multinationals. The next challenge is to embed it in a general equi-
librium framework that would allow us to understand what determines
the distribution of ﬁrms according to their type of organization.
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